Article 36 Weapons Reviews are the correct means to assess a weapon, means, or method of warfare and its use, as required by Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention. The UK is aware that despite the large numbers of States being signatories to the first Protocol, not all formally conduct legal weapons reviews. Conversely there are States that are not signatories to the Protocol which conduct Article 36-style legal weapons reviews. The UK is committed to transparency where possible in this area, and so has published its weapons review procedures online. I will include the link in the version of this statement which will be uploaded to the CCW website
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/507319/20160308-UK_weapon_reviews.pdf). We hope that sharing our approach may encourage other states to publish theirsh, or begin implementing such reviews if they don’t do so already. The UK welcomes engagement and comments on its process. To this end, the UK hosted a Weapons Review Forum in October 2015 at which 14 states and a range of academics discussed the Article 36 obligations and how best to give effect to them. NGOs views were also represented. Another such forum is planned for October 2016.
The UK’s Article 36 reviews are conducted by a team of military lawyers from all three Armed Services who work closely with the equipment project teams. This can mean attending demonstration days, technical meetings and talking to the companies that design and build the equipment. The lawyers engage with the project teams early and throughout the procurement cycle, but will aim to conduct formal legal reviews at three stages. These stages are described in more detail at the web link I mentioned earlier. These stages are designed to ensure that a legal review is provided prior to major decisions being made about progress and spending, so that IHL requirements are part of the decision making process. The details of individual UK Article 36 reviews are confidential due to factors including the classified nature of the equipment reviewed, the accompanying legal advice and the sensitive commercial and contractual nature of the related procurement processes. However, we can describe the five main areas considered in the reviews:
- Whether the weapon is prohibited, or whether its use is restricted by any specific treaty
provision or other applicable rule of international law; - Whether the weapon is of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering;
- Whether it is capable of being used discriminately;
- Whether it may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment; and - Whether it is likely to be affected by current and possible future trends in the development of
International Humanitarian Law.
Any system, whether it displays any level of autonomy or not, would have to meet the required standards for all five of the areas of consideration. Assessing weapons systems with increasing levels of automation or autonomy does not require another process. The requirement for Article 36 Reviews is already prescribed in International Humanitarian Law. So we do not see the need for additional legislation, in the form of a pre-emptive ban. Instead, we would like to see greater compliance with existing IHL.
It is worth noting that all weapons can be used unlawfully. The Article 36 review cannot stop a weapon being used unlawfully by an unscrupulous user intent on breaking the law, or by a badly trained operator. However, it can ensure that a weapon is capable of being used lawfully before it is sanctioned for use by the military. In the UK, the danger of misuse by an operator is addressed through robust training, clear Rules of Engagement, rigorously tested Concepts of Operation and the availability to commanders of operational legal advisers.
United Kingdom Statement to the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (11-15 April 2016) 2-3
