We would also like to appreciate your deft handling of this body and your introduction under this topic, which we found very useful. Some very pertinent questions were raised by you. … [W]e can go with you, when you characterise our discussions under this topic, that there is significant convergence in terms of value of legal reviews. My delegation also recognises this value and welcomes the information that has been shared by various delegates in terms of the good practices and procedures and legal reviews that are being carried out. We take note of the provisions contained in Article 36 of [AP I] and the Guiding Principle (e) on this subject. However, where we differ is whether the existing provisions for national legal reviews are sufficient to address the challenges that have been raised by [AWS]. And we believe that they’re not sufficient. Had these legal reviews been adequate, we would not have had the need for the development of the CCW and its protocols, prohibiting and regulating certain category of weapons, as the Article 36 obligation dates back to 1977. Article 36 reviews are national procedures beyond any kind of international oversight and verification. We believe that these legal reviews should not be considered as a substitute to replace multilateral standards.
… we would also like to lend support to several voices we have heard this morning in terms of highlighting and listing challenges being faced during the conduct of these national legal reviews with regards to [AWS] in terms of inexplainability, machine learning, the scope of these reviews during the entire life-cycle of these weapon systems, as well as the resources required to conduct such reviews. Article 36 and Guiding Principle (e) requires that the legal review be conducted during the study, development, acquisition or adoption of the weapon system. If the learned weapon system behaviours are reviewed periodically only once they are adopted on the battlefield, it is also possible that by the time the behaviour is assessed, the weapon system may have already been operating in an unreviewed manner. Another challenge is the question of standard of acceptance with regards to system failure, where countries may differ from each other in terms of acceptability threshold. Mr. Chair, therefore, we believe that traditional approaches to the legal review of these weapons are insufficient to determine the legality of weapon systems that learn on the battlefield, and new processes will need to be developed. In our paper, we highlight that national measures related to [AWS] will lack harmonisation and consistency of application by all states. Moreover, questions surrounding compliance with IHL and possible further codification of IHL, in response to development and use of these weapons systems cannot be left to the sole prerogative of national authorities. Compliance and verification provisions are key ingredients for developing international legally binding rules. Non legally binding options including transparency and confidence building measure, sharing of good practices, find their meaning, context and purpose in the backdrop of internationally agreed binding rules, which such non binding measures can compliment but cannot replace.
Statement by Pakistan under agenda item 5, topic 5 (9 March 2023, transcript)
