United States

This entry has been drafted by a member of the APILS team on the basis of publicly available materials. Its content has been neither peer reviewed nor checked for accuracy by any government official.

Overview

Legal review practices in the US pre-date the adoption of AP I. The US is not a State party to AP I and does not regard Article 36 as reflecting customary international law. It engages in a robust practice of conducting reviews of the legality of weapons as a matter of domestic policy, and regards such reviews as good practice to facilitate the implementation of international law applicable to weapons and their use in armed conflict. Each of the military services is responsible for reviewing weapon systems it develops or acquires. The review process considers the following three questions: first, whether the weapon falls within a class of weapons that is specifically prohibited by customary international law and treaty law applicable to the US; second, whether the weapon’s intended use is calculated to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; and third, whether the weapon is inherently indiscriminate. Further, if the weapon is not prohibited, the review should also consider whether there are other restrictions (eg, domestic law and policy) on the weapon’s use that are specific to that type of weapon. Finally, it may be appropriate to advise whether further measures should be taken that would assist in ensuring compliance with law of war obligations related to the type of weapon being acquired or procured.

US Department of Defence (‘DoD’) DoD Directive 2311.01: DoD Law of War Program establishes DoD policy that ‘[t]he intended acquisition, procurement, or modification of weapons or weapon systems is reviewed for consistency with the law of war’. In January 2023, the DoD also revised DoD Directive 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems (‘Directive 3000.09’). This directive does not set out practice in conducting legal reviews; rather, it establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for developing and using autonomous and semi-autonomous functions in weapon systems, including armed platforms that are remotely operated or operated by onboard personnel. Among other things, it provides that such systems will undergo rigorous hardware and software verification and validation (‘V&V’) and realistic system developmental and operational testing and evaluation (‘T&E’); and establishes guidelines designed to minimise the probability and consequences of failures in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that could lead to unintended engagements. Directive 3000.09 also establishes the Autonomous Weapon Systems Working Group to support senior authorities in the DoD in considering the full range of relevant DoD interests during the review of AWS and to advise on potential issues presented by such weapons during a potential senior-level policy review in accordance with the directive that would be supplementary to a legal review.

References

Key documents

Historical documents

Further resources

Archive of positions