Recommendations towards a normative framework
11. In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of any AWS, States must be able to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by IHL or any other applicable rule of international law.
It is to be noted, that review of weapons, involving techniques or tools related to artificial intelligence (AI) is complex.
As has been pointed out by the ICRC, [“]AI will inevitably introduce uncertainty into the functioning of a weapon—meaning that the reviewer cannot predict with a reasonable degree of certainty all the outcomes of using the weapon. This unpredictability can arise through the weapon’s design or the interaction between the system and the environment of use. Foreseeing effects may become increasingly difficult as weapon systems become more complex or are given more freedom of action in their tasks, and therefore become less predictable. Uncertainty about how a weapon will perform in the field undermines the ability to carry out a legal review, as it makes it impossible for the reviewer to determine whether the employment of the weapon would in some or all circumstances be prohibited by IHL or other rules of international law[“]3.
In this regard, a reviewer will need to be satisfied that the proposed AI design and its method of use will not prevent the operator or commander from exercising the judgments required by IHL.
Recommendations on prohibitions and regulations
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… the delegations of Brazil, Chile and Mexico propose the following outline of a normative framework, conducive to an instrument establishing prohibitions and regulations:
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4. As a complimentary measure to those referred in sections 1, 2 and 3, regulations on the review of AWS, must include an assessment that allows for the understanding of their attributes and effects, in particular:
4.1. Its design and characteristics;
4.2. Its technical performance, including in terms of reliability and predictability and whether its foreseeable effects are capable of being limited to military objectives and controlled in time and space;
4.3. Its intended or expected use; and
4.4. The placement of adequate limits on asks and types of targets, in particular there must be certainty that they are not prejudiced by technological or social biases[;]
4.5. Whether its employment in some or all circumstances would be prohibited under [IHL] and international law.
5. Legal reviews of AWS should adopt a precautionary approach and deny authorization when there might be less than full certainty of all the characteristics listed in the paragraph above.
Understanding the unviability of full disclosure by States of every aspect of a legal weapons’ review due to strategic, defense, intellectual property and other considerations, there should be a parallel process to determine the specific characteristics that weapons systems reviews should have related to the use of emerging technologies. As such, a GGE within the CCW might be established to consider this issue. …
Procedural recommendations
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… Brazil, Chile, Mexico propose the following text as recommendation for the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems for the Sixth Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons:
The Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems recommends to the States Parties that it would continue its work in the year 2022 with the following mandate: …
5. To establish a Group of Governmental Experts on Weapons Legal Reviews and Emerging Technologies, tasked with identifying best practices and specific challenges, as well as determining and, if applicable, recommend new rules to ensure their effectiveness.
