Positions of States and Organisations

States and some organisations have expressed their views about the utility, purpose, scope and process of the legal review of weapons in various different contexts. Some of these views have been recorded domestic documents, such as military manuals on the law of armed conflict. Increasingly, however, States and organisations have articulated their positions in a range of international fora, either through written submissions or oral interventions.

This database compiles and organises publicly expressed views in relation to legal reviews, without prejudice to their relative significance or effect (for example, in terms of the development of customary international law). The database aims to comprehensively reflect the views of states but only covers the positions of a small number of selected organisations.

This database currently contains 379 positions and is continuously updated. Any corrections, or suggestions to add material, are welcome.

2021

  1. National Commentary by Canada

    June 2021State or organisation: CanadaForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    Canada implements a permanent national legal review of all of its weapons systems. Canada fully complies with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which requires states to determine whether new weapons, means or methods of warfare may be employed lawfully under …

2020

  1. Statement by the Netherlands

    24 September 2020State or organisation: NetherlandsForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    The Netherlands considers weapons reviews — mandatory for us under international law — crucial for all weapon systems, including weapon systems with some degree of autonomy. A better understanding of how weapon reviews work and sharing experiences and best practices will contribute to improve the …

  2. Statement by the United States

    24 September 2020State or organisation: United StatesForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    Additionally, Guiding Principle (e) reaffirms the importance of a robust practice of conducting reviews of the legality of weapons. Such reviews are a good practice to facilitate the implemen-tation of international law applicable to weapons and their use in armed conflict, and can also help …

  3. Statement by Costa Rica

    22 September 2020State or organisation: Costa RicaForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    Mi delegación es de la firme convicción que esta revisión legal integral por expertos legales y como parte de un intercambio amplio e inclusivo con expertos operativos y tecnológicos debe 3 realizarse de manera enfocada, y tomando como base los avances logrados ya por el …

  4. Statement by the Netherlands

    22 September 2020State or organisation: NetherlandsForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    Turning to the issue of the development and testing of weapons, the Netherlands wishes to emphasize once again the importance of legal weapon reviews. As a State Party to [API], the Netherlands has a standing legal review process for all new weapons, means and methods …

  5. National Commentary by Austria

    1 September 2020State or organisation: AustriaForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    The legal weapon review outlined in Article 36 of the Geneva Additional Protocol of 1949 requires that "In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its …

  6. National Commentary by the United Kingdom

    1 September 2020State or organisation: United KingdomForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    As pointed out in the 2019 report of the GGE, exchange of good practice relating to key activities such as legal weapon reviews could be beneficial. We continue to believe this has merit and believe it not only to be an area worthy of focus, …

  7. National Commentary by the United States

    1 September 2020State or organisation: United StatesForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    This guiding principle reaffirms the principle in Article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The United States is not a party to the Additional Protocol I and does not regard Article 36 as reflecting customary law, but engages in …

  8. National Commentary by the Netherlands

    September 2020State or organisation: NetherlandsForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    The Netherlands is a State Party to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (AP I) and has a standing legal review process for all new weapons, means and methods of warfare as well as for all modifications to existing weapons, means and methods of …

  9. National Commentary by the Russian Federation

    September 2020State or organisation: RussiaForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    In accordance with guiding principle e), the Russian Federation fully complies with its obligations under Article 36 of the AP I. We consider it a norm of customary international law. This Article has no provisions on how exactly legal reviews should be conducted, and does …

  10. National Commentary by Israel

    31 August 2020State or organisation: IsraelForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    During the GGE meeting of 11-15 April 2016, Israel presented its own domestic process for legal review of new weapons. Notwithstanding that Israel is not party to [AP I] and as such is not bound by Article 36 of that Protocol, Israel is of the …

  11. National Commentary by Portugal

    31 August 2020State or organisation: PortugalForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    This Guiding Principle mimics much of the language used in Article 36 of Additional Protocol I (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts). Moreover, Portugal notes that this Guiding Principle echoes …

  12. National Commentary by Sweden

    30 August 2020State or organisation: SwedenForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    States have an obligation under international law (article 36 of AP I) to determine whether the employment of a new weapon would be prohibited under international law. In Sweden, this is carried out by the Delegation for International Humanitarian Law Monitoring of Arms Projects. All …

  13. National Commentary by Japan

    28 August 2020State or organisation: JapanForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    This principle is considered stipulating substantially the same provision as that of Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention on August 12, 1949. Article 36 can be interpreted as obligating each High Contracting Party, in its research, development, acquisition or adoption …

  14. National Commentary by Switzerland

    25 August 2020State or organisation: SwitzerlandForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    Switzerland would like to recall the obligation of all States to “respect and ensure respect” for IHL (see common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions) and the prohibition to use means and methods of warfare in contradiction to IHL. Therefore, an implementation of IHL in …

  15. Operationalizing the Guiding Principles: A Roadmap for the GGE on LAWS

    6 August 2020State or organisation: BrazilForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    2. … Brazil would like to put forward four paths of action to build upon the guiding principles and fulfill the mandate of the GGE. The four paths, and its working methodology, are based on a “bottom-up” approach that benefits from domestic advancements in policies …

  16. National Commentary by Cuba

    20 July 2020State or organisation: CubaForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    [22] It is an obligation of States to ensure that their weapons comply with the rules and principles of international law, including [IHL]. New technologies have to comply with international law as well. Article 36 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 …

  17. National Commentary by Spain

    6 July 2020State or organisation: SpainForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    To start with, States should assess, through legal reviews of new weapons and new methods of warfare, whether the level of human involvement in the new system would violate IHL. In case a legal review identifies a use that might be problematic, doctrine and training …

  18. Commentary by the ICRC

    July 2020State or organisation: ICRCForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    States Parties to 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions have a legal obligation to conduct legal reviews of new weapons. In the ICRC’s view, the requirement to carry out legal reviews also flows from the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. Besides these …

  19. National Commentary by Germany

    26 June 2020State or organisation: GermanyForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    Germany reaffirms that Guiding Principle (e) underlines the importance of human responsibility during the phases preceding the deployment of a weapon system. Particularly for highly complex systems with autonomous functions, the development phase is of crucial importance since the configurations determining the behavior of the …

  20. National Commentary by France

    10 June 2020State or organisation: FranceForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    In concrete terms, in order to ensure that IHL is fully applied to weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS – in compliance with guiding principle “a”5 and in line with their existing obligations – High Contracting Parties (HCPs) should, for …

  21. National Commentary by Finland

    June 2020State or organisation: FinlandForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    A rigorous weapons review, in line with Article 36 of [AP I], is essential for determining the legality of any new means or method of warfare. In the area of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and machine autonomy, the review needs to be critical, …

  22. National Commentary by Australia

    2020State or organisation: AustraliaForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    Australia believes that an aspect of the current system of international law – embodied in Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 contributes to the robust framework for regulating weapons systems, including those with autonomous functionality. Australia’s approach …

  23. National Commentary by Italy

    2020State or organisation: ItalyForum: GGE LAWS 2020

    … in compliance with the guiding principle “e”4, the level of predictability and reliability of a weapon system must be assessed in the phases of testing, verification and certification, given that autonomous functions must be defined ex ante, starting from the stage of requirement, analysis …