Weapons reviews are a valuable tool to ensure the compliance of a specific LAWS with international law. We find that in addition to conducting a weapons review when a new weapons system is taken into use, a weapons review should also be conducted when a weapon or weapons system is modified or used differently from …
While not the sole solution for the challenges associated with increasing autonomy in weapons systems, legal reviews are a crucial instrument and thus can be part of the solution. A well-designed weapons review mechanism has not only the potential to determine whether or not an AWS is designed in a way that it could be …
… although for Belgium the adoption of an international legally binding instrument looking to prohibit and regulate autonomous weapon systems is necessary, my delegation nevertheless thinks that national legal reviews are the best way to fully implement the obligations contained in an international instrument, whether it be binding or not, at a national level. In …
… legal review is stipulated in Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. All states parties should strictly implement their obligations. Most states parties, including China, have relevant review and evaluation mechanisms as a CBM. Countries are encouraged to formulate corresponding legal review mechanism in light of their national conditions. Statement by China (GGE LAWS, 6 …
Effective legal reviews are a clear obligation for states that are party to Additional Protocol I and, for all states, they’re critical to ensuring that their armed forces comply with IHL rules in the use of any weapon systems. And the ICRC endorses the view, which has already previously been recognized by this group’s guiding …
We suggest that there is a need to strengthen the issue of responsibility in the creation and production of autonomous systems, making them auditable and limiting to the black box. In 2018 and 2019, we presented two documents emphasizing the existing obligations to carry out assessments of weapons under Article 36 of the Additional Protocol …
As we said before, obligations under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I do not provide for an automatic prohibition of one or other kind of weapons as not in line with the requirements of IHL because of the objective impossibility of providing for and taking into account all cases of improper use. We believe that …
Australia, Canada, Estonia, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, United States
Article 1. Preventing Autonomous Weapon Systems That, By Their Nature, Are Incapable of Use in Accordance With IHL IHL prohibits the use of an autonomous weapon system if it is of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, if it is inherently indiscriminate, or if it is otherwise incapable of being used in …
